Archive for the ‘Communication’ Category

Building knowledge in projects – A practical application of social constructivism to information systems development (Jackson & Klobas, 2008)

Donnerstag, Oktober 23rd, 2008

Building knowledge in projects - A practical application of social constructivism to information systems development (Jackson & Klobas, 2008)

Jackson, Paul; Klobas, Jane: Building knowledge in projects – A practical application of social constructivism to information systems development; in: International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 26 (2008), No. 4, pp. 329-337.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2007.05.011

Jackson & Klobas describe the constructivist model of knowledge sharing and thus organisational learning. This classical model describes knowledge sharing in organisations as a constant cylcle of

  • Creating personal knowledge
  • Sharing newly created personal knowledge = Externalisation
  • Communication knowledge = Internalisation
  • Acquiring other peoples‘ knowledge = Learning

This cylcle includes the facilitating steps of Objectivation (=creating organisational knowledge), Legitimation (=authorising knowledge), and reification (=hardening knowledge) between externalisation and internalisation.

Jackson & Klobas argue that IT project failure can be explained using this model. The authors outline and discuss three failure factors – (1) lack of personal knowledge, (2) inability to externalise knowledge, and (3) lack of communication.

Images as action instruments in complex projects (Taxén & Lilliesköld, 2008)

Montag, Oktober 20th, 2008

Images as action instruments in complex projects (Taxén & Lilliesköld, 2008)

Taxén, Lars; Lilliesköld, Joakim: Images as action instruments in complex projects; in: International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 26 (2008), No. 5, pp. 527-536.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.05.009

Images are quite powerful. I hate motivational posters which a distant corporate HQ decorates every meeting room with, but I once saw the department strategy visualised by these folks, they include all employees and the group dynamic is unbelievable. Later on they cleaned the images, blew them up, and posted them around the company – of course, meaningless for an outsider but a powerful reminder for everyone who took part.

Taxén & Lilliesköld analyse the images typically used in project management. They find that these common images, such as PERT/CPM, Gantt charts, or WBS are increasingly difficult to use in complex projects, in this case the authors look into a large-scale IT project.

Based on Activity Domain Theory they develop alternative images better suited for complex projects. Activity Domain Theory, however, underlines that all tasks on a project (= each activity domain) have a motive, fulfils needs, modifies objects, and has actors. Outcomes are produced by activity domains and are at the same time prerequisites for activity domains. Activity domains have activity modalities, which can be either manifested as resources or as communal meaning. These activity modalities are

  • Contextualisation = situation of human action
  • Spatialisation = need for spatial orientation in human action
  • Temporalisation = need for certain order in human action
  • Stabilisation = need for certain rules and norms in human action
  • Transition = need for interaction between activity domains

Useful images, the authors argue, need to fulfil these needs while being situated in the context of the activity. Traditional images focus on optimisation and control, rather than on coordination and action. Thus alternate images need to focus on dependencies and integration; on value comprehensibility and informality over formality and rigour.

Alternative images suited for complex project management are

  • Anatomies – showing modules, work packages and their dependencies of the finished product, e.g., functional node diagrams
  • Dependency diagrams – showing the incremental assembly of the product over a couple of releases, e.g. increment plan based on dependencies (a feature WBS lack)
  • Release matrices – showing the flow of releases, how they fit together, and when which functionality becomes available, e.g., integration plan
  • Information flow diagrams – showing the interfaces between modules, e.g. DFD

Tailored task forces: Temporary organizations and modularity (Waard & Kramer, 2008)

Montag, Oktober 20th, 2008

Tailored task forces: Temporary organizations and modularity (Waard & Kramer, 2008)

Waard, Erik J. de; Kramer, Eric-Hans: Tailored task forces – Temporary organizations and modularity; in: International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 26 (2008), No. 5, pp. 537-546.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.05.007

As a colleague once put it: Complex projects should be organised like terrorist organisations – Autonomous cells of highly motivated individuals.

Waard & Kramer do not analyse projects but it’s fast paced and short lived cousin – the task force. The task force is THE blueprint for an temporary organisation. The authors found that the more modularised the parent company is, the easier it is to set-up a task force/temporary organisations. Waard & Kramer also found that the temporary organisations are more stable if set-up by modular parent companies. They explain this with copying readily available organisational design principles and using well excercised behaviours to manage these units.

The more interesting second part of the article describes how a company can best set-up task forces. Waard & Kramer draw their analogy from Modular Design.

„Building a complex system from smaller subsystems that are independently designed yet function together“

The core of modular design is to establish visible design rules and hidden design parameters. The authors describe that rules need to be in place for (1) architecture, (2) interfaces, and (3) standards. The remaining design decisions is left in the hands of the task force, which is run like a black box.
In this case Architecture defines which modules are part of the system and what each modules functionality is. Interface definition lays out how these modules interact and communication. Lastly, the Standards define how modules are tested and how their performance is measured.

Determinants for external communications of IT project managers (Müller 2003)

Montag, Juli 14th, 2008

 Determinants of Communication

Müller, Ralf: Determinants for external communications of IT project managers; in: International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 21 (2003), No. 5, pp. 345-354.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(02)00053-4

Müller analysis empirically the determinants of external communication of IT project managers in a business-to-business market. The study is based on the concepts of Media Richness Theory (which postulates that the richer the medium the more effective the communication) and Transaction Economics.

Müller finds no evidence for an influence of the organisation’s structure. The risk in the project has a negative impact on communication frequency and communication contents in general. Specifically he finds that higher risk increases communications frequency and preference for face-to-face meetings whilst decreasing the preference for written reports.
Relational norms have a positive influence on communication frequency, media, and contents.

The impact of principal–agent relationship and contract type on communication between project owner and manager (Müller & Turner, 2005)

Montag, Juli 14th, 2008

Communication and Contract type

Müller, Ralf; Turner, Rodney J.: The impact of principal–agent relationship and contract type on communication between project owner and manager; in: International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 23 (2005), No. 5, pp. 398-403.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2005.03.001

Müller & Turner argue that a project should be analysed in two distinctive stages pre and post contract. The pre contract perspective follows the laws outlined in Transaction Economics (or Transaction Cost Theory), which postulates that companies choose the governance structure with the lowest transactions costs. Specifically the degree of asset specificity, the degree of uncertainty, and the frequency of transactions determine the transaction costs both parties (vendor and buyer) consider in this phase.

The post-contract perspective is best conceptualised by the Principal-Agent-Theory, specifically by with the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection. Game theory usually calls this equilibria with correlated strategies and calls for contractual design in a way that each player is receiving incentives for compliance.

On a side-note: This behaviour is a classical chicken game. Imagine a vendor and a buyer who build up an integrated team. Both agree (orally) to send their most experienced experts (unfortunately they cost more), which would be best for the project work to be done. In this game each party can choose to give the work either to experts or to rookies:

  Rookies Experts
Rookies (0,0) (8,2)
Experts (2,8) (6,6)

Thus it is better for each team to sent rookies if the other team sends experts (which gives us the two Nash-equilibria of the game). If vendor and buyer send their rookies no one will know what is going on and what they have to do and both earn nothing (0,0). On the other hand the oral agreement of both parties to send their experts is not credible. Since this is a one-shot game the strategy (6,6) can only be reached if both parties agree on binding contracts or a negotiator.

Müller & Turner show that decisions made in the pre-contract phase with the objective to minimize the transaction costs (e.g. fixed-price or cost-plus contracts) can potentially have
have adverse effects on the project in the post-contract phase – by increasing the administrative costs for communication due to their negative impact on owner–manager
collaboration.