Archive for the ‘Contracting’ Category

Understanding time delay disputes in construction contracts (Iyer et al. 2008) & Delays in construction projects (Sweis et al., 2008)

Dienstag, September 23rd, 2008

Sources and categories of delay in construction

Iyer, K.C.; Chaphalkar, N.B.; Joshi, G.A.: Understanding time delay disputes in construction contracts; in: International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 26 (2008), No. 2, pp. 174-184.

Sweis, G.; Sweis, R.; Hammad, A. Abu; Shboul, A.: Delays in construction projects – The case of Jordan; in: International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 26 (2008), No. 6, pp. 665-674.

In my recent obsession with delays [it’s quite sarcastic, I know], I read through these two articles on delays in the construction industry.
Sweis et al. analyse sources of delays on construction projects. The authors identify three main categories contributing to delays –  internal environment, exogenous factors, and input factors.
Internal environmental factors are financial difficulties, poor planning & scheduling, and too many change orders. Exogenous factors found are severe weather and changes in government or regulation laws. The input factor causing delay was a shortage of manpower.

In the second article Iyer et al. look into the contractual strings attached to delays. Therefore they categorise delays in excusable vs. non-excusable. Excusable delays are

  • Labour disputes
  • Force majeure
  • Unusual delay in deliveries
  • Unavoidable delay
  • Unforseen delay in transportation
  • Other unforseeable causes

Non-excusable delays and therefore punishable by fines are

  • Ordinary weather
  • Subcontractor delay
  • Contractor’s failure to coordinate the project site
  • Contractor financing problems
  • Contractor failure to ramp-up
  • Delay in obtaining materials
  • Poor workmanship

[On how many IT projects have I seen non-excusable delays which were excused.]
Lastely, Iyer et al. identify the origins of disputed delays, they were due to

  • Handover on site
  • Release mobilisation advance
  • Late receipt/checking of drawings
  • Accidents
  • Temporary stoppage
  • Re-work
  • Extra work

The impact of principal–agent relationship and contract type on communication between project owner and manager (Müller & Turner, 2005)

Montag, Juli 14th, 2008

Communication and Contract type

Müller, Ralf; Turner, Rodney J.: The impact of principal–agent relationship and contract type on communication between project owner and manager; in: International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 23 (2005), No. 5, pp. 398-403.

Müller & Turner argue that a project should be analysed in two distinctive stages pre and post contract. The pre contract perspective follows the laws outlined in Transaction Economics (or Transaction Cost Theory), which postulates that companies choose the governance structure with the lowest transactions costs. Specifically the degree of asset specificity, the degree of uncertainty, and the frequency of transactions determine the transaction costs both parties (vendor and buyer) consider in this phase.

The post-contract perspective is best conceptualised by the Principal-Agent-Theory, specifically by with the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection. Game theory usually calls this equilibria with correlated strategies and calls for contractual design in a way that each player is receiving incentives for compliance.

On a side-note: This behaviour is a classical chicken game. Imagine a vendor and a buyer who build up an integrated team. Both agree (orally) to send their most experienced experts (unfortunately they cost more), which would be best for the project work to be done. In this game each party can choose to give the work either to experts or to rookies:

  Rookies Experts
Rookies (0,0) (8,2)
Experts (2,8) (6,6)

Thus it is better for each team to sent rookies if the other team sends experts (which gives us the two Nash-equilibria of the game). If vendor and buyer send their rookies no one will know what is going on and what they have to do and both earn nothing (0,0). On the other hand the oral agreement of both parties to send their experts is not credible. Since this is a one-shot game the strategy (6,6) can only be reached if both parties agree on binding contracts or a negotiator.

Müller & Turner show that decisions made in the pre-contract phase with the objective to minimize the transaction costs (e.g. fixed-price or cost-plus contracts) can potentially have
have adverse effects on the project in the post-contract phase – by increasing the administrative costs for communication due to their negative impact on owner–manager