Archive for August 12th, 2008

Flexibility at Different Stages in the Life Cycle of Projects: An Empirical Illustration of the “Freedom o Maneuver“ (Olsson & Magnussen, 2007)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

Flexibility and Funding in Projects

Olsson, Nils O. E.; Magnussen, Ole M.: Flexibility at Different Stages in the Life Cycle of Projects: An Empirical Illustration of the “Freedom o Maneuver“; in: Journal of Project Management, Vol. 38 (2007), No. 4, pp. 25-32.

The conceptual model, that uncertainty and degrees of freedom decrease during the life cycle of a project whilst the actual costs increase, is nothing new. New is the empirical proof. Olsson & Magnussen are the first to measure the degrees of freedom. They use the governmentally required reduction lists as a measure for the degrees of freedom in public projects.

Moreover they recommend a funding system which gives the project manager control over the basic budget and the expected additional costs (e.g. the value of the risk register). On top of this funding go the reserves or contingencies, which typically are about 8% of the total budget and which are managed by the agencies. Then comes the reduction list, which usually is 5.9% of the budget in the beginning of the project and reduces to 0.8% at half time. The authors argue that such a funding system has 85% probability of being kept.

Best Project Management and Systems Engineering Practices in the Preacquisition Phase for Federal Intelligence and Defense Agencies (Meier, 2008)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

 Best Project Management and SE Practices

Meier, Steven R.: Best Project Management and Systems Engineering Practices in the Preacquisition Phase for Federal Intelligence and Defense Agencies; in Project Management Journal, Vol. 39 (2008), No. 1, pp. 59-71.

Scope Creep! Uncontrolled growth in programs, especially public acquisitions is nothing new. [I highly suspect that we only look down on public projects because private companies are much better in hiding their failures.] Meier analyses the root causes for scope creep in intelligence and defense projects and proposes counter actions to be taken.

The root causes for creeping scope are

  • overzealous advocacy
  • immature technology
  • lack of corporate technology road maps
  • requirements instability
  • ineffective acquisition strategies, i.e. no incentives to stick to the budget
  • unrealistic baselines and a high reliance on contractor baselines
  • inadequate systems engineering, e.g. no concept of operations, system requirements document, statement of work, request for proposal, contact data requirements list
  • workforce issues, e.g. high staff turnover, no PMO

Meier’s remedies for this predicament are quite obvious. Have a devil’s inquisitor or a third party review to get rid of the optimism bias. Wait until technology maturity is achieved or factor in higher contingencies. Set investment priorities. Put incentives into the contracts. Estimate own costs prior to RfP. Follow systems engineering standards, e.g. INCOSE’s. Manage your workforce.

Public-Private Partnership – Elements for a Project-Based Management Typology (Mazouz et al., 2008)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

 PPP Typology

Mazouz, Bachir; Facal, Joseph; Viola, Jean-Michel: Public-Private Partnership – Elements for a Project-Based Management Typology; in: Journal of Project Management, Vol. 39 (2008), No. 2, pp. 98-110.

In this article Mazouz et al. develop a typology for public-private-partnerships. They span a matrix along the two dimensions of proximity of target and capacity to generate projects. The proximity „refers to the position of the public organisation in relation to its target clientèle“.

  1. Situational Partnership (close distant, high capacity)
  2. Symbiotic Partnership (close distant, low capacity)
  3. Elementary Partnership (high distance, high capacity)
  4. Forward-looking Partnership (high distance, low capacity)

As the authors further point out a forward-looking partnership is most difficult to manage. This type is characterized by the public company being far away from my usual client base and a low capacity to generate future projects out of this PPP.
To manage these challenges Mazouz et al. recommend two distinct types of PPPs – contractual and relational PPP. A contractual PPP is best suited for well defined, measurable projects, based on management systems; whereas a relational PPP is best when tasks are continuously re-defined, the outcome is ambiguous, and the project is based on individuals.

Motivation: How to Increase Project Team Performance (Peterson, 2007)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

Motivational mistakes and how to overcome them

Peterson, Tonya M.: Motivation – How to Increase Project Team Performance; in: Project Management Journal, Vol. 38 (2007), No. 4, pp. 60-69.

Peterson explores the big DON’Ts of team motivation. Motivation she argues is best explained by five theories (1) Theory X, (2) Theory Y, (3) Herzberg’s KITA, (4) McClelland’s need for achievement, and (5) MBTI. Peterson then continues to outline the 8 DON’Ts of team motivation and what can be done to correct them

  • Whatever motivates me, will motivate others
  • People are primarily motivated by money
  • Team members love to receive formal awards
  • Give them a rally slogan
  • The best leader is a strong cheerleader
  • These people are professionals, they don’t need motivation
  • I’ll motivate them when there is a problem
  • I’ll treat everyone the same – people like that and it will motivate them

The remedies to all these points boil down to a couple of points

  • Do not withdraw from the team, involve yourself, guide, support the team
  • Acknowledge that people are different (from you and each other)
  • Leadership is about mentoring and individual problem solving

Information Systems Project Management Decision Making – The Influence of Experience and Risk Propensity (Huff & Prybutok, 2008)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

Decision Making on IS Projects

Huff, Richard A.; Prybutok, Victor R.: Information Systems Project Management Decision Making – The Influence of Experience and Risk Propensity; in: Journal of Project Management, Vol. 39 (2008), No. 2, pp. 34-47.

Huff & Prybutok analyse the antecedents of decision making of project managers in IT projects. Their hypothesis includes that knowledge and risk behaviour have an impact on decision-making. In both cases that can be empirically proven. Although knowledge is mostly driven by project management experience, whereas work experience has no influence on making decisions. The risk behaviour can be explained by the risk propensity, which are the „perceived psychological/emotional costs of the decision“.
In short this means continuation decisions (which were the subject of this research) are influenced by the managers project management experience and by his/her risk propensity.

Formulation of Financial Valuation Methodologies for NASA’s Human Spaceflight Program (Hawes & Duffey, 2008)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

Real Option Modelling of Projects

Hawes, W. Michael; Duffey, Michael R.: Formulation of Financial Valuation Methodologies for NASA’s Human Spaceflight Program; in: Journal of Project Management, Vol. 39 (2008), No. 1, pp. 85-94.

In this article Hawes & Duffey explore real option analysis as a financial management tool to evaluate projects. The basic idea behind that is management can make go/no-go decisions thus eliminating the downside variability of the value of the project. In short you can always kill a project gone bad of course with sinking some costs.
[Some might call again for Occam’s razor and argue that it is sufficient to model this into the cash flow, because for the option price you need a cash flow anyway. But the authors ]

To put the classical Black-Scholes formula to use the authors look for equivalents to the input variables. More specifically they analyse NASA’s space flight program and valuated projects in respect to their go/no-go decision after the conceptual design. The authors used as input variables

  • NPV of project cash flow = Asset-value (S)
  • Actual one-time development costs = Exercise cost of the option (X)
  • Time until go/no-go decision = Expiry time of the option (T)
  • 5% treasury bill rate of return = Risk-free rate of return (R(f))
  • Historical data on initial budget estimate vs. actual development costs = Distribution of underlying (σ²)

Hawes & Duffey then compare the Black-Scholes pricing to the NPV and find that projects with higher volatility and longer time until decisions are higher priced than short-term decisions with less volatility (i.e. history of cost overruns).

I do find the managerial implications quite counter-intuitive. I modelled some Black-Scholes pricing for a real life project I worked on. My project had a NPV of 48 Mio. EUR but only an option price of 17 Mio EUR since the company had a history of cost overruns and a lot of front-loaded costs, in fact 70% of total expenditures would be spend before the go/no-go decision.
That is all very well and I can clearly see how that improves the decision making,
but if I look into the sensitivity analysis the longer the time to decision and the higher the volatility the higher is my option’s price. This is where I do not fully understand the managerial implication. Given that a similar judgement rule to a decision based on NPV comparison, I would favour a project where I decide later and I would favour projects from a department with higher variability in costs, because this gives me a higher degree of flexibility and higher variability can yield a higher gain. Surely not!?!?

Can Project Management Learn Anything from Studies of Failure in Complex Systems? (Ivory & Alderman, 2005)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

Complex Systems and Local Interventionism

Ivory, Chris; Alderman, Neil: Can Project Management Learn Anything from Studies of Failure in Complex Systems?; in: Journal of Project Management, Vol. 36 (2005), No. 3, pp. 5-16.

This article is similar to the Cooke-Davis et al. from 2007. In this article Ivory & Alderman describe complex systems as being tightly coupled thus showing high degrees of interdependencies and creating complex interactions. The authors show that projects as Complex Systems have five distinctive characteristics

  1. Non-linear interactions – surprising/unexpected outputs, non-equilibrium states, tipped by small events
  2. Emergence – multiple causes for failures, sub-systems prevent system melt-down, unpredictability of failures
  3. Conflicting objectives – sub-systems with different and conflicting goals, dominance of trade-off decisions, short-term orientation
  4. Overly centralized management – more than one centre exist, tighter control does not solve problems
  5. Multi-Nodality – open-textured and multi-nodal technologies are managed uniformly despite their dispersed (and often not understood) contexts

To counter-act the shortcomings of classical project management which relies on tight control and standardised processes & policies, Ivory & Alderman recommend what they call „Interventionism“. Interventionism or interventions on the ground is the „flexibility to usurp the chain of command in favour for technical expertise in times of stress“. Especially slack engineered into plans and processes allows local ‚cells‘ to deal with dysfunctions of the central control authority.
If that slack is not used for these corrections it usually is used for self-improvement and learning. In order to make such a system work the authors recommend implementing local empowerment to fix errors and centrally embed processes for organisational learning from mistakes.

Furthermore Ivory & Alderman’s case study is set in an high reliability organisations, which has only few resource constraints, shows a procedure-driven top down management, learns from mistakes, and embraces a safety culture. In their case study complexity arises not from technology but from goal confusion among different customers and is further increased by inexperienced contractors. The project decomposed the final product so it could be build in mixed teams. This multi-nodality showed some major shortcomings, e.g., bad news were withheld, integration problems are created, management of change requests becomes more resource consuming.

In this setting the authors found Interventionism most helpful. They observed how vendor-client task forces were established as autonomous cells. These cells worked in advance of official decisions in order not to delay the plan due to central decision backlogs. They saw increased communication among leaders of cells. Furthermore they found most effective if the project sponsor forces the project to abandon it’s natural short-term view by carrying the concerns of operations and fulfilment of business needs.

Project Management Practice, Generic or Contextual – Reality Check (Besner & Hobbs, 2008)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

Tool usage in different types of projects

Besner, Claude; Hobbs, Brian: Project Management Practice, Generic or Contextual – Reality Check; in: Project Management Journal, Vol. 39 (2008), No. 1, pp. 16-33.

Besner & Hobbs investigate the use of project management tools. In a broad survey among 750 practitioners, they try to find patterns when different tools are applied to manage a project. They authors show that tool usage depends on the factors

  • Organisational maturity level of project management
  • Project similarity and familiarity
  • Level of uncertainty in project definition
  • Internal customer vs. external customer
  • Project size and duration
  • Product type

Among these factors the last one is the most interesting. Besner & Hobbs grouped their sample into three legs according to product type a) engineering & construction, b) IT, and c) business services.
So where do IT projects fall short compared to their counterparts in Engineering and Construction?
One area is the vendor management (bidding documents, conferences, evaluations) which is a strong point in E&C but a weak one in IT. Another area is the cost planning (financial measurements, cost data bases, top-down/bottom-up estimation, software for estimating costs) and in execution IT projects show lesser usage of Earned Value Techniques and Value Analysis.
[Fair enough – I do think – the intangibility of IT projects makes it difficult to apply these concepts unbiased and meaningfully].

Nine Schools of Project Management (Bredillet, 2007-2008)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

 9 Schools of Project Management

In his series of editorials for the Journal of Project Management Bredillet outlines 9 different schools of project management thinking and when they were created. He also identifies research questions for each of them.

  1. Optimisation School (1950)
    Earned Value Management
  2. Modelling School (1960)
    Integrating hard-soft systems
  3. Governance School (1970)
    PMOs, portfolio management, project selection, regulatory compliance
  4. Behaviour School (1975)
    Virtual teams, HR management in project-oriented companies
  5. Success School (1985)
    Refinement of success criteria, stakeholder satisfaction, causes of failure
  6. Decision School (1990)
    Anchoring estimates, organisation strategy & impact on portfolio, portfolio management decisions
  7. Process School (1980)
    Project categorisation, refinement of processes, project audits & reviews, maturity models
  8. Contingency School (1995)
    Clarify differences in approaches, methods of adaptation, link to success criteria
  9. Marketing School (2000)
    Strategy/tactics for business success, linking projects and strategy, align senior level thinking to projects, CRM and PR on projects

Judgment under Uncertainty – Heuristics and Biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974)

Dienstag, August 12th, 2008

Judgment Heuristics and Biases

Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel: Judgment under Uncertainty – Heuristics and Biases; in: Science, Vol. 185 (1974), No. 4157, pp. 1124 – 1131.
DOI: 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124

Biases have evolved to lower our energy needed to make decisions, so they do have quite a natural place in our ape-sized world. Last time I checked wikipedia lists 100 biases, heuristics, and memory errors. Kahneman & Tversky published the first theorization in this article [also published as a part of this book].

Starting with the now classical example of the Gambler’s fallacy the authors explore three judgment heuristics commonly found in science and economic decision making (1) Adjustment & Anchoring, (2) Representativeness, and (3) Availability.

Anchoring & Adjustment (Decisions often rely on a single piece of information) – Kahneman & Tversky show that persons usually guess probabilities more accurately if they have been presented with an anchor. They show that students do overestimate their success when asked at the beginning of a term. This overestimation is slightly corrected if they were given or asked for an anchor, such as ‚what do you think was the grade distribution of your fellow students last term?‘.

Representativeness (Commonality is assumed for similar events or objects) – The authors describe several misconceptions of chance and insensitivities to prior probabilities, sample sizes, and predictability. They also describe the illusion of validity, but the the misconception of regression is the most important of these biases. It is also the reason why we have control groups in double-blind experimental studies.
Regression towards the mean means that in any given random process every sub-group will produce the same distribution [give or take effects of the sample size]. For example, assume that a group has been split into quartiles according to the results after the first run of the random process. The repetition of this process will automatically produce the same distribution in each sub-group, thus the bottom quartile will be better and the top quartile will perform much worse without any effect of a stimuli which has been applied.

Availability (Expected probabilities influenced by the ease of brining examples to mind) – In their classical example for the retrievability bias subjects have been asked to estimate the proportion of words in the English language that start with R or K and the proportion of words that have R or K as a third letter. This bias leads people to underestimate the number of words with R or K as a third letter.